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The Annotated Bibliography of Works in Response to Lloyd Bitzer

Selected Works in Response to Lloyd F. Bitzer

presented here alphabetically by the author’s last name.

Brinton argues that despite the attention given to Bitzer’s “The Rhetorical Situation,” a proper definition of a rhetorical situation has yet to be given. He takes up the subject by examining the relationship between rhetorical situation and rhetorical act. Although much of the critical scholarship on Bitzer implies that Bitzer saw a causal relationship between the situation and the act, Brinton argues that Bitzer is really a proponent of a normative relationship – the situation declares what the rhetorical act should be – and Brinton also holds this position. “Rhetorical acts are to be evaluated in terms of the degree to which they fit the situation. It is for this reason that situation is essential and basic to the theory of rhetoric” (238). Finally, Brinton examines Bitzer’s ideas of facts and interests. He argues that facts are objective, but that the interests of the rhetor should be looked at subjectively. This means that a rhetor could act to modify a situation even though the actions might not be in her best interests. Ultimately, though critical at times, Brinton is interested in extending Bitzer’s theory of the rhetorical situation and coming up with a more plausible explanation of how rhetorical act is grounded in rhetorical situation.

Larson analyzes Bitzer’s work on rhetorical situations. He suggests that Bitzer’s work leads discourse to be classified in two parts – the rhetorical and the non-rhetorical. He argues that a third class is necessary – discourse that was conceived as rhetorical but did not fulfill its purpose and was, therefore, non-rhetorical. He also takes issue with Bitzer separating rhetoric from science, philosophy, art, religion, and so forth, claiming that scientific discourse could, in fact, arise from a rhetorical exigence (the rhetor’s perception of a gap in the audience’s knowledge, for example). These ideas are in clear opposition to Bitzer’s desire to limit the field of rhetoric. Larson does offer a list of conditions pertaining to the rhetorical situation that could be studied in more depth, including the expected response of the audience, the probability of the audience modifying an exigence, the urgency the audience will feel to act, the importance of the discourse’s success, and the consequences if the discourse fails in its stated purpose. These conditions keep the spirit of Bitzer’s rhetorical theory more than Larson’s other ideas.

In this paper presented at the CCCC, Pullman examines Bitzer’s rhetorical in light of the historical divide between theory and practice in rhetoric. Like the classical rhetoricians, Bitzer relies on a separation between theory and practice to formulate the idea of situational rhetoric. However, Pullman argues, rhetorical theory cannot be completely separated from rhetorical practice. He asserts that even Plato and Aristotle were practicing rhetoric when speaking on “purely theoretical” grounds. Thus, he concludes, “The fond hope of a rhetorical theory, in the sense of a disinterested description needs to be abandoned or at least revised to include a great deal of self reflective inclusivity” (6). While challenging Bitzer on the grounds that there can be a totally objective element in rhetoric (which is required of the exigence in Bitzer’s theory), Pullman supports the idea that situation plays a major role in rhetorical discourse.

Vatz takes issue with Bitzer’s description of a rhetorical situation. He believes Bitzer views meaning from a realist philosophy viewpoint, meaning that one only need observe a thing to glean its meaning. Bitzer described a rhetorical situation being comprised of exigence, audience, and constraints. Vatz points out that while Bitzer claims the exigence should be a topic where “positive modification” is possible, there are items, such as the military-industrial complex, where positive modification is difficult to define; this does not make the situation less rhetorical, he argues. Furthermore, Vatz contends that situations are not defined by historical facts and events, but that facts and events become options – the rhetor must choose which facts or events he or she will give significance to and determine how to communicate that significance. Therefore, meaning is not something to be discovered, but something to be created. The linguistic choices the communicator makes, therefore, will be value-laden and ideologically driven (e.g., choosing “organizations” instead of “machines” signifies a certain set of values). The presence of values and ideologies in rhetorical decisions, then, creates a greater moral responsibility for the rhetor in Vatz’s view than in Bitzer’s. Vatz uses historical examples of the Vietnam War and especially the Cuban Missile Crisis to show how rhetorical choices – President Kennedy choosing to “give salience” to Cuba – created political and military situations. His argument implies that had Kennedy not declared a crisis with Cuba, there would have been no crisis. The Sept. 11th terrorist attacks, however, call this argument into question. Had President Bush chosen to ignore the attacks, there still would have been loss of life, public outcry, hate crimes perpetrated against Muslims, and fear of future attacks. Certainly, the president’s (and other leaders’) rhetorical choices in responding to the situation influenced future events. Declaring military action an essential response, for example, created an environment for the declaration of war; an alternative rhetoric would have been to call for a return to isolationism and using the military for increased homeland defense. There are, of course, many other ways rhetoric was employed during and after 9/11/01; the main point here is that some of the rhetoric was driven by situation (Bitzer’s view) and some of the situations were driven by rhetoric (Vatz’s view). This event shows that a middle ground between the two viewpoints is necessary for truly understanding rhetorical situations.

Published in “The Forum section of the Quarterly Journal of Speech, this short essay responds directly to theories of rhetorical situation espoused by Bitzer and John Patton. Vatz maintains that the “situational” theory of rhetoric is in direct opposition to his “rhetorical” point of view (95), in which the situation is created by the rhetor’s selection of facts, persuasive techniques, and linguistic choices. Citing Bitzer’s example of air pollution as a case of situational rhetoric, Vatz argues that Bitzer neglects to mention a number of facts about solving the problem of air pollution, such as the costs to be borne by polluting companies and the jobs that could be eliminated as a result of those costs. Thus, he argues, Bitzer is arbitrarily selecting facts and thereby creating the situation – not the other way around, as Bitzer would argue. In very plain language, he rejects Bitzer’s theory: “The argument here is that there is no such thing as a discrete and discernible situation, that meaning does not inhere in facts or events, and that the linguistic depiction of events by rhetors reflects rhetor choice always and situational demands never” (99).

Walzer critiques Bitzer’s “The Rhetorical Situation” from a composition studies point of view, looking for a way to apply the ideas of rhetorical exigencies to academic discourse. Walzer maintains that there are three exigencies that brought about Bitzer’s essay, none of which are mentioned in the essay: the need to establish a moral standard for the discipline of rhetoric, the need to distinguish rhetorical criticism from other types of criticism, and the need to provide a scientific basis for the study of rhetoric. Walzer states, “The failure of the essay to invoke specifically these exigencies is indicative of the inadequacy of both Bitzer’s objectivist formulation of the concept of the rhetorical exigency and his critics’ subjectivist view” (5). The correct way to understand rhetorical exigencies, Walzer states, is through interpretive communities. In other words, the exigency does not control the rhetor, nor does the rhetor create the exigencies. The audience interprets the exigencies. Walzer then advances a proposal for first-year composition courses. While it’s not completely clear how Walzer’s theory would look in practice, the idea is that students would not be asked to create an audience or to imagine what an audience might want from a specific instance of communication; rather, the instructor would teach the students about the exigencies of a particular community. The students’ understanding of the exigencies would then guide their composition. This essay is important in the study of Bitzer’s work because it brings his theory of the rhetorical situation into composition studies.

Young argues that Bitzer is a crucial figure in the study of modern rhetorical theory, primarily because of his work in defining the “rhetorical situation.” She assesses that much of the backlash against Bitzer’s ideas were because he published “The Rhetorical Situation” in 1968, “at the dawn of the postmodern era, as the emphasis in critical assessment of rhetoric was shifting from the rhetor to the audience” (275). Young summarizes the various critiques and defenses of Bitzer throughout the 1970’s, ‘80’s, and ‘90’s. In the process, she demonstrates how influential “The Rhetorical Situation” has been for a prolonged period of time and how it remains relevant to scholarly conversation about rhetorical studies. Young’s article, however, does not give attention to the numerous analyses of philosophers and rhetoricians that Bitzer conducted – analyses that made up a significant portion of his body of work.