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The Annotated Bibliography of the Works Written and Edited by Lloyd Bitzer

over the course of his career.

Bitzer summarizes modern interpretations of Aristotle’s enthymeme – “substance of rhetorical persuasion.” Bitzer finds that most modern scholars regard the enthymeme as difficult to define; they derive their definitions by contrasting it to the syllogism. After reviewing modern interpretations of the enthymeme, Bitzer argues that the enthymeme is a particular type of syllogism, where the speaker supposes the audience’s opinions and premises and develops the syllogisms from there. The premises are, therefore, suppressed, making the enthymeme an “incomplete syllogism.” Bitzer’s interpretation of the enthymeme, then, is based on the process of creating rhetoric rather than the speech, or rhetorical “product” his contemporaries focus on. Bitzer is thinking about oratory rather than composition in this article, but the relationship he describes between the speaker and imagined audience during the invention phase could easily apply to composition studies as well.

Bitzer reviews the criticisms against George Campbell’s “Doctrine of Evidence,” which deals with the problem of knowledge – how does a rhetor know his or her words are really the truth? Campbell subscribes to a theory of inductive and deductive reasoning. He divides inductive reasoning into pure intellection (evidence based on axioms or known truths), consciousness (observations), and common sense (“an original source of knowledge common to all mankind”). Bitzer holds common sense to be the most important of Campbell’s inductive evidences because without it, the rhetor could not reconcile beliefs that are not verifiable by reason or observation. Campbell’s deductive reasoning is demonstrative (chains of truths derived from pure intellection) and moral evidence (based on intuition from observations and common sense). Bitzer examines criticisms of the common sense evidence – the critics argued that this evidence was not really evidence because it could not be proven true. According to Bitzer, common sense remains valuable evidence because without it even the most outlandish claims could not be proven false. A second criticism is that Campbell was deficient in logic. Bitzer again defends Campbell, saying that Campbell’s system of rhetoric was based more on language and ideas that the traditional practice of pure logic. Further, he argues, Campbell’s chief concerns were epistemological, not logical. Campbell’s ideas on common sense differentiate his theory of evidence from Plato’s (based on forms and ideals) and Augustine’s (based on spiritual revelation).

Bitzer, using an Aristotelian definition of rhetoric, argues that all rhetorical discourse is grounded in a situation. He defines the rhetorical situation as one that has an exigence that can undergo positive modification caused or assisted by discourse. He gives the example of air pollution as an exigence that can be positively modified as a result of discourse. Second, a rhetorical situation requires an audience. Bitzer contends that a rhetorical audience is one that can be persuaded by the rhetor’s discourse and can act to make positive changes to the exigence. Finally, rhetorical situations are marked by constraints – things that could prevent the positive modifications from taking place. Bitzer lists beliefs, attitudes, texts, facts, traditions, images, interests, and motives among constraints. In this article, Bitzer clearly separates rhetorical discourse from other types of discourse – he specifically mentions philosophical, scientific, and poetic discourses, though he does allow for situations when a play or poem, for example, could arise in response to a given situation. In these cases, Bitzer argues, the discourse becomes rhetorical rather than poetic. Bitzer thus seems very interested in categorizing and defining types of discourse rather than looking for similarities between different discourses.

Bitzer researches the ideas of David Hume and finds in them a source for many of George Campbell’s ideas presented in The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Bitzer demonstrates that Campbell was a vocal, active member of the Philosophical Society of Aberdeen, which studied and critiqued the works of Hume. Campbell divided the study of rhetoric into practical rhetoric (rules for effective communication) and philosophical rhetoric (the reasons behind the rules). Campbell, like Hume, intended to study rhetoric empirically, through observation and experimentation. His purpose and methodology, Bitzer claims, are nearly identical to Hume’s. Bitzer goes on to point out similarities between Hume’s writing and Campbell’s. Notably, Bitzer claims, “David Hume is unquestionably the source of Campbell’s notion of vivacity” (151). Vivacity, or the liveliness of expression, is an integral part of Campbell’s philosophy of rhetoric; likewise, it is an important concept in Bitzer’s own studies – the subject of his doctoral dissertation. In Hume’s and Campbell’s theory of rhetoric, regardless of the purpose of communication, the rhetor must “communicate ideas which compel belief” (157) through their liveliness. Bitzer states that the process of enlivening ideas is a problem that permeates Campbell’s philosophy. Because Hume is the source of Campbell’s ideas about vivacity, Hume is, therefore, a central figure underneath The Philosophy of Rhetoric.

Bitzer and Black participated in the National Development Project in Rhetoric in 1970 and presented the proceedings of two conferences (The Wingspread Conference and The National Conference on Rhetoric) in this collection. The purpose of the Project was to investigate how rhetoric should be used and studied in the second half of the twentieth century. Bitzer and Black draw the following conclusions from the two conferences: 1. Rhetorical studies should be “broadened to explore communicative procedures and practices not traditionally covered” (238). The rise of new technologies in the twentieth century gave rise to new possibilities in rhetoric not previously imagined. 2. “Our recognition of the scope of rhetorical theory and practice should be greatly widened” (238). 3. “A clarified and expanded concept of reason and rational decision must be worked out” (238–39). 4. “Rhetorical invention should be restored to a position of centrality in theory and practice.” These conclusions, along with the scope of the essays included in the volume, demonstrate how Bitzer and Black saw themselves, and other scholars of rhetoric at that time, at a crossroads in rhetorical studies. New theories were on the horizon, but classical approaches to rhetoric still dominated the educational landscape. Bitzer’s involvement in the Project may have fed his interest in finding new applications for traditional rhetorical theory. His work before 1970 primarily focused on the work of George Campbell; after 1970, however, he published his influential works on the rhetorical situation and public knowledge.

Seeing the National Development Project as “a turning point in the development of our field” (207), Bitzer exhorts the attendees of the National Conference on Rhetoric to re-envision rhetorical studies for the second half of the 20th century. Bitzer argues that rhetorical studies have never had more importance that at that moment because of the diversity of publics, ideas, forms, and information sources arising from the technology revolution. Additionally, he states, “The crucial problems of the next decades will be solved, if at all, either by the assistance of campaigns of discourse or by coercion” (201). Bitzer encourages his colleagues to renew their focus on the study of rhetorical methods with an emphasis on invention. He claims invention was pushed aside by the empirical focus of the 18th century rhetoricians. This essay in particular demonstrates the uncomfortable crossroads of rhetorical studies Bitzer perceived in the 1970s. While he sees room for an expansion of rhetorical studies, in the contemporary vein, he also desires a return to the classical roots of the discipline.

Bitzer explores the concept of public discourse by defining “public” and exploring how a public authorizes knowledge as truth. He maintains that, “A public is a community of persons who share conceptions, principles, interests, and values, and who are significantly interdependent” (68). He cites offices, schools, laws, and tribunals as institutions that may further characterize a community. Bitzer examines who may speak on behalf of a public and concludes that the public has the right to authorize spokespersons. Likewise, the public authorizes the message of the spokespeople; in other words, the public decides what will be true for that group of people. Thus, the public exists first and public knowledge is one of its publics. This idea contrasts with John Dewey’s idea that publics are formed by agreeing on a truth; shared knowledge joins communities into publics. Bitzer argues that what Dewey describes as “communities” are really already publics and that they must exist as a public before they can collectively decide what ideas to assign value to. Bitzer then differentiates between public knowledge and private knowledge. Public knowledge is knowledge or truth that cannot exist without the public. Private knowledge, however, can be “bare facts,” scientific observations, or opinions held by individuals. Bitzer cites the Declaration of Independence as an example of public knowledge. The “unalienable rights” of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” he claims, are not self-evident by means of scientific inquiry, nor will they produce contradiction if they are denied. Thus, “they are authorized by a community with a history and tradition in which these truths grew and were accredited […] They continue to serve as principles of public life – constituents of public knowledge” (87). Likewise, the injuries committed by the Crown are only unjust because the American public did not authorize the rights of the Crown to take such actions. Having shown the relationship between publics and the authorization of knowledge as truth that creates values, Bitzer looks at the role of rhetors in the production and consumption of public knowledge. He concludes that, “The great task of rhetorical theory and criticism, then, is to uncover and make available the public knowledge needed in our time” (92). What he does not delve into, however, is who determines what is necessary. In his argument, it seems that rhetors and scholars are privileged to deem certain public knowledge necessary – this is far less democratic than his idea that the public as a whole can authorize knowledge as truth.

In this essay, Bitzer takes up the idea of situational rhetoric. He continues to define a rhetorical situation as being comprised of an exigence (a problem or defect that can be positively modified), an audience that can make that modification, and constraints that can influence the rhetor and audience. Bitzer claims that situations can be physical or mental, or a combination of the two. People constantly try to bring their environment (physical or mental) closer to an ideal. Next Bitzer looks at which exigencies are rhetorical – which imperfections are capable of being modified through discourse. “Exigencies are clearly rhetorical when they are capable of positive modification and when such modification requires or invites messages that engage audiences who can modify those exigencies through their mediating thought, judgment, or action” (27). A rhetorical exigence consists of two parts – factual (“anything physical or mental whose existence is (or is thought to be) independent of ones personal subjectivity”) (28) and interest (the ideas, opinions, or values that become motives for action). Four ways of agreeing/disagreeing are possible for the rhetor and audience: They agree on both the factual and the interest; they agree on the factual but have different levels of interest; they have the same interest but disagree about the facts; they do not agree about the facts or interest. Responses to exigencies are based on the following: degree of interest, modification capability, risk, obligation and expectation, familiarity and confidence, and immediacy. Finally, Bitzer describes the four sages in the life of a rhetorical situation: origin and development of constituents, maturity, deterioration, and disintegration. Bitzer’s argument in this essay is well conceived and logically sound. It does not, however, answer questions of how the “ideal” world we strive for is created – he does not address whose ideal we are to strive for in our situational rhetoric.

Bitzer responds directly to Vatz’s article, “Vatz on Patton and Bitzer.” He states that he does not understand Vatz’s point of view and that many of the theoretical implications of situational rhetoric Vatz attributes to him are not his ideas at all. The key difference between the two theorists seems to be on how they define rhetoric. Vatz works off a broader definition of rhetoric, one that encompasses almost any persuasive discourse. Bitzer, on the other hand, uses a very narrow definition of rhetoric – one that has a strong moral element to it. Anyone who attempts to manipulate, deceive, or create their own reality engages in sophistry and can be easily dismissed. Furthermore, to Bitzer, rhetoric is very practical, controlled by historical events and factual reality, and not argument for arguments sake. His final statement in the response hints at his conception of rhetoric: A theory or practice of rhetoric that lacks contact with experiential realities, or that refuses to be constrained by them, is largely irrelevant to pragmatic activity” (101). With Vatz and Bitzer coming from such different viewpoints, then, it is not surprising that there is so little common ground between them.

Bitzer critiques George Campbell’s statement that “All art is founded in science.” He defines Campbell’s use of science to mean psychology, or human nature, in modern terms. Bitzer argues that if taken to its logical conclusion, Campbell’s link between rhetoric and psychology would mean that the basic principles and terms of rhetoric would be those of psychology; rhetoric would lose its place as an independent subject. Ultimately, this is where Bitzer disagrees most stringently with Campbell; while he sees merits in Campbell’s beliefs, as well as the eighteenth century thinking that guided them, Bitzer believes Campbell’s insistence on grounding rhetoric in human nature limited his ability to accurately perceive and analyze rhetorical discourse.

Bitzer analyzes the use of tyrannical rhetoric in Orwell’s 1984, concluding that the political rhetoric in the novel had three main characteristics: control, power, and will. Orwell created a society in which the rhetors added evil to those characteristics, and tyranny resulted. The cure for this tyranny, Bitzer asserts, is to replace evil with wisdom as the fourth attribute. Interestingly, in most of his other writing, Bitzer does not look to literature as a source for rhetorical studies; generally, he classifies literature as “poetic” and not rhetoric. In the case of 1984, however, he makes an exception, noting “Orwell’s novel should be read as a fictional treatment of major themes examined dialectically by Plato in the Gorgias” (6). To connect this essay to Bitzer’s own rhetorical theory, then, one could say that the exigence is the potential for tyrannical rhetoric in the real world, as reflected in Orwell’s novel, and the audience is scholars of rhetoric. The constraints are the conventions of academic discourse and literary analysis.

Bitzer summarizes Richard Whately’s views of inferring and proving in Elements of Rhetoric. “Proving, the rhetorical process, requires invention of arguments through the discovery of premises; whereas inferring requires skillful selection and combination of premises yielding valuable conclusions” (316). Inferring involves the discovery of truth from a set of premises, whereas proving involves finding premises that show that a given conclusion is true. Proving is essential to rhetoric, in Whately’s view, which he defines as the process of argumentative composition. Bitzer remarks that like the 18th century rhetoricians, Whately has little to say about invention techniques. Unlike his predecessors, however, Whately believed investigation was a process that must take place before rhetorical activity, not as a part of rhetoric. Bitzer criticizes Whately’s theory for placing a “prover” rather than an “orator” at the center of rhetoric (331). Bitzer states that an orator may arouse emotion, rather than prove a point, and in Whately’s view this would not be considered rhetoric. This point harkens back to the influence of Campbell’s “vivacity” on Bitzer’s conception of rhetoric. This article demonstrates Bitzer’s continuing desire to sort out rhetorical theories and to show where they align with other theories in the history of rhetorical studies and where they depart significantly. Unlike his own work in developing rhetorical theory, this article does not offer implications for Whately’s view in the modern era.

Bitzer reminisces on editing The Prospect of Rhetoric and the conferences it records. He talks about the genesis of the conference, and he adds his recommendations for the future of rhetorical studies. Notably, he contends that the field of rhetoric should be narrowed considerably, reversing the trend started by the “new rhetoricians” in the 18th century of including all communications as rhetoric. This sentiment echoes ideas found in his other essays when he differentiates between situations that are rhetorical and situations that are not. In this brief essay, we get a glimpse of Bitzer’s theory of rhetoric in a mature, completed state – he is chiefly concerned with defining what situations and discourses are rhetorical (as opposed to philosophical, spiritual, political, or poetic) and analyzing them for the purpose of understanding how rhetorical discourse functions in the modern age.

Bitzer describes the appearance of the “Indian Prince” or king of Siam in miracle arguments. The legend goes that the king of Siam heard a story of water freezing so thick in winter that an elephant can walk on it. The king dismisses the story as absurd and the speaker loses credibility with him. In other words, the king preferred his experience, which did not include ice, to the testimony of experts. John Locke recounts the story, claiming that miracles of God are capable of inspiring belief despite being contrary to our experience. Thomas Sherlock uses the story to defend miracles; his argument extends Locke’s, saying that although miracles are contrary to uniform experience, the true laws of nature cannot be known by humans and are not defined by uniform experience. Peter Annet takes up the story in a critique of Sherlock. According to Annet, the ice is not miraculous – if the king wanted to observe ice, he could go to the source and see it. A true miracle, on the other hand, would not be verifiable by fact. Joseph Butler relates the story as an example of probable evidence, which cannot be relied upon to reach certain fact. Bitzer then turns to David Hume’s “Of Miracles,” first published in 1748. Hume asserts that miracles do not exist. He argues that experiences with miracles are largely flawed, as people who believe in the existence of miracles are likely to view their experiences in such a way to support the miracle in question. Hume dismisses the story of the “Indian Prince” as evidence for or against miracles because it does not deal with a universal experience and is not comparable to miracles. Philip Skelton wrote the first published critique of Hume’s essay. He tells the story of a “Negro” who had never before seen ice, but will believe in it because he has no reason to believe the people who tell him about ice are trying to deceive him. He exhibits rational belief, just as people who believe in miracles do. In the second edition of “Of Miracles,” Hume expands on his assessment of the Indian Prince. He states that the ice is not conformable to the prince’s experiences and he is therefore justified in not believing. Bitzer goes on to cite numerous additional criticisms of Hume’s essay, including a critique by George Campbell. Bitzer sums up the criticisms: Hume’s distinction between contrary and noncomformable is fallacious because both a miracle (contrary to experience) and an extraordinary event (nonconformable) are simply more or less unusual in relation to experience and are therefore simply nonconformable. Thus. Hume must treat miracles and extraordinary events exactly the same: he admits the latter are provable; he must admit miracles are provable” (214). This essay is a good example of how different rhetoricians and philosophers have viewed evidence, investigation, and the production of knowledge over the years. There are implications for these views in modern rhetoric studies; however, Bitzer does not offer any of those implications in the essay – he’s content to simply discuss the interpretations of the “Indian Prince” legend in relation to miracles.

In this short essay, Bitzer reflects on how Edwin Black came to work in the Rhetorical Studies department at the University of Wisconsin and about his accomplishments while there. The piece gives insight into the development of rhetorical studies as a field; when Black first came to Wisconsin, half the department taught in theater or broadcasting. By the time he retired in 1994, those disciplines had their own department and Black and Bitzer were arguing with university leadership for increased resources for their department. Mostly, though, the piece shows Bitzer’s fondness and appreciation for the friendship and collegial camaraderie of Black.